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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a nursing/care home malpractice case. Judy Nield ("Ms. Nield") sued Pocatello 
Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Pocatello Care and Rehabilitation Center ("PCRC"), alleging that she 
became infected with Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus ("MRSA") and pseudomonas 
aeruginosa ("PA") due to PCRC's breach of the standard of care. 
For over three years, as a result of PCRC's infecting Ms. Nield with MRSA and PA, Ms. 
Nield has been bed bound, as she has no leg below her left knee, nor does she have any right hip 
bone below her hip. It is not disputed that prior to her admission to PCRC, Ms. Nield tested 
negative for MRSA and P A. Approximately 3 months after her admission, Ms. Nield contracted 
MRSA and PA, based on tests done November 9,2007. 
PCRC and its nurses and other care givers failed to wash their hands and wear gloves after 
treating MRSA and PA infected residents. Washing hands and wearing gloves were simple steps 
to prevent infecting Ms. Nield, which PCRC and its staff did not follow. 
PCRC further failed to follow Ms. Nield's doctor's orders requiring daily wound assessments 
of Ms. Nield's wounds. PCRC either did not document the wounds correctly or did not do it at all. 
PCRC knew Ms. Nield was highly sLlsceptible to those infections, due to her open wounds. PCRC 
also knew that Ms. Nield was housed with other residents infected with MRSA and PA, yet failed 
to follow the simple acts of washing their hands and wearing gloves, thereby knowingly exposing 
and infecting Ms. Nield with MRSA and P A. 
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Despite the fact that the record sLlpports Ms. Nield's position that PCRC infected her with 
MRSA and PA, tbe District Court, erroneoLlsly, granted PCRC's motion for summary judgment. 
The District Court erroneously weigbed the evidence in favor of PCRC, thereby usurping the 
province of the jury to decide the factual issues of this case. 
The Course (dthe Proceedings Be/OJ!! 
On October I, 2009, Ms. Nield filed her Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
against PCRC'. R., pp. 1-10. PCRC filed its Answer November 12, 2009. R., pp. 11-18. The 
parties engaged in written discovery and took depositions. On October 8, 2010, PCRC filed its 
Motion for Summary Judgment, with supporting affidavits and memorandum. R., pp. 180-448. 
Ms. Nield filed her Memorandum in Opposition to PCRC's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
with supporting affidavits, a Motion to Continue Hearing on Summary Judgment or in the 
Alternative Additional Time to Supplement the Record, and Motion to Strike the Affidavit of 
PCRC's expert, Dr. CotTman, on November 29,20 10. R., pp. 520-1146. On December 6, 20 I 0, 
PCRC filed a Motion to Strike portions orMs. Nield's experts' affidavits submitted in opposition 
to PCRC's motion, a Memorandum in Opposition to Ms. Nield's request to continue the hearing on 
summary judgment, and its reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. R., 
pp. 1147-1199. On December 9, 2010, Ms. Nield filed a reply memorandum in support of her 
motion to continue the summary judgment hearing, a memorandum in opposition to PCRC's motion 
to strike portions of Ms. Nield's experts' affidavits in opposition to PCRC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and a reply memorandum in support of her motion to strike the Affidavit of PCRC's 
expert, Dr. Coffman. R., pp. 1204-1224. 
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The hearing on PCRC's motion for summary judgment and motion to strike portions of Ms. 
Nield's experts' affidavits, as well as Ms. Nield's motion to strike the Affidavit of Dr. Coffman and 
motion to continue hearing on summary judgment occurred on December 13,20 I O. Tr., pp. 8-61. 
On January 21, 2011, the District Court, the Honorable Robert C. Naftz presiding, issued its 
Memorandum Decision and Order granting PCRC's motion. R., 1225-1236. 
On February 4, 201 I, Ms. Nield filed a Motion for Reconsideration ofthe District COLlrt' s 
decision granting summary judgment. R., pp. 1237-1254. PCRC fi led its memorandum in 
opposition to the motion. R., pp. 1255-1271. The parties stipulated to continue the hearing on the 
Motion for Reconsideration, which the District Court granted. R., pp. 1272-1273~ pp. 1284-1285. 
Ms. Nield submitted a reply memorandum in support of her Motion for Reconsideration on February 
25,2011. R.,pp.1274-1283. 
The hearing on Ms. Nield's Motion for Reconsideration was held March 28,2011. Tr., pp. 
62-100. On May 3, 20 11, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order denying 
Ms. Nield's Motion for Reconsideration. R., pp. 1286-1298. Also, on May 3, 2011, the District 
Court entered Judgment in favor of PCRC, but ordered each party to pay their own respective 
attorney's fees and costs. R., pp. 1299-1300. 
On May 12,2011, Ms. Nield filed her Notice of Appeal. R, pp. 1308-1313. On May 18, 
2011, PCRC filed a Motion to Amend Judgment, which Ms. Nield opposed by filing an opposing 
memorandum and affidavit. R., pp. 1301-1336. PCRC filed a request for additions to the clerk's 
record on May 26, 2011. R., pp. 1316-1317. On June 9, 2011, PCRC filed a second request for 
additions to theclerk's record. R.,pp.1337-1338. On June 16,2011, Ms. Nield filed a request for 
additions to the clerk's record. R., pp. 1341-1343. 
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On June 6, 2011, the District Court denied PCRC's Motion to Amend Judgment. R., pp. 
1344-1345. 
Statemellt of Facts 
On August 21,2007, Ms. Nield was taken to the ER departmcnt at Portneuf Medical Center 
("PMC"). At the time, Ms. Nield was suffering from four open wounds on her left leg, as well as 
cellulitis, and other medical conditions. R., pp. 563-581. Ms. Nield was admitted to PCRC on 
August 25, 2007, so she could recuperate enough to have hip replacement surgery and other 
prosthetic procedures done. R., pp. 596-599. 
While at PMC, and priorto her admission to PCRC, Ms. Nield was tcsted for MRSA and PA. 
The test results were negative for any MRSA and PA. R., pp. 582-594. Ms. Nield's wounds were 
cu ltured at PMC on her admission to that f~lcility. There is no evidence that some but not all oEher 
wounds were cultured at the time of her admission to PMC. Further, the record is undisputed that 
PMC met its standard of care in testing for MRS A and PA. The tests PMC performed, which were 
done and Llsed in the ordinary course of Ms. Nield's care and treatment, showed she was negative 
for MRSA and PA. It was not, and is not the standard of care for PMC to do any more testing than 
it did. PCRC's expert, Dr. Coffman acknowledged in his affidavit: "Screening incoming patients 
for MRSA was not coml11on practice as of August 2007, and was not a part of the standard of care." 
R., p. 212 (,r 13); Tr., p. 29, L.14-24. 
It was undisputed below, that PCRC relied on PMC's testing that Ms. Nield was negative 
for MRSA and PA at the time she was admitted to PCRC. It was also undisputed tbat PCRC did not 
test Ms. Nield for MRSA or PA prior to or during her stay at its facility. 
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Upon admission to PCRC, PCRC's wound care nurses knew Ms. Nield's physician ordered 
PCRC to provide daily wound assessments. R., p. 603. Despite this, PCRC's nurses did not do 
daily assessments. R., pp. 605-637. PCRC's medical stafTgcneratcd cryptic medical records, which 
did not identify or document accurately Ms. Nield's four open wounds in her left leg. R., pp. 648-
653; pp. 1027-1029; pp. 1095-1097; pp. 1102-1106 Instead of performing daily assessments, PCRC 
did weekly skin assessments. R., pp. 648-653; pp. 1027-1029: pp. 1095-1097; pp. 1102-1106. 
PCRC either did not perform the assessments well, or not at all. fd. PCRC stopped documenting 
the assessments, without any explanation, on two of Ms. Nield's wounds on September 18,2007. 
R., p. 605; p. 607. Further, PCRC's nursing staff stopped documenting anything regarding Ms. 
Nield's largest leg wound on October 22,2007, three weeks prior to her being positively cultured 
for MRSA and PA. R., p. 608; pp. 648-649; p. 1104. Thideficiency was admitted to by one of Ms. 
Nield's wound care nurses at PCRC, Joyce Maxfield, who testified Ms. Nield's wound care records 
could have been more accurate. R., p. 678 (p. 77, II. 12-22). 
On November 13,2007, Ms. Nield's left leg wounds were cultured. R., pp. 681-685. The 
test results showed Ms. Nield was positive with infections of MRS A and P A. ld. This was a trivial 
matter to PCRC's former administrator, Derrick Glum, who testified that "it was not warranted" for 
PCRC to conduct an investigation as to how Ms. Nield acquired MRSA and PA while she was at 
PCRC. R., pp. 1130-1131(p. 58, I. 4 to p. 63, 1.6). 
PCRC had in place, while Ms. Nield was a resident, an "Infection Control Policy and 
Procedure Manual ("Manual")." R., pp. 687-872. However, not everyone at PCRC was given a 
copy of the policy, which PCRC's directors of nursing and staff developer admitted. R., pp. 664-
665( p. 21, II. 18 to p. 22, I. 2); p. 881 (p. 26, I. 10-15)). PCRC's manual required that its staff do 
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a self evaluation to lI1sure its employees were following policies regarding infection control 
practices. R., p. 740 Further, PCRC's manual had "Compliance Rounds Forms" which were to be 
filled out to monitor universal precautions and documentation of infections. R., pp. 864-865. 
However, the Director of Nursing during Ms. Nield's residency, testified that she "did not recall" 
lIsingthe Compliance Rounds Forms at PCRC and "didn't recall ever seeing this [compliance rounds 
forms] before." R., pp. 903-904 (p. 25, I. 21 to p. 26, I. 5). Further, as to the staffselfevaluation 
form PCRC's staffwere required to perform every six months, PCRC's Director of Nursing testified 
those forms did not look familiar to her. R., p. 904 (p. 26, II. 1-22). PCRC's Director of Nursing 
was in charge of monitoring its staff to ensure they complied with its infection control prevention 
procedures. R., pp. 903 ( p. 24, I. 22 to p. 25, I. I) PCRC did nothing to follow its own protocols 
to protect patients like Ms. Nield, resulting in her contracting MRSA and PA. 
PCRC failed to monitor its medical care givers, to ensure that they were follo'vving basic 
infection prevention procedures, such as hand washing. PCRC's manual required that, to prevent 
the spread of infection, the care giver was first required to obtain gloves, open the package, without 
touching the gloves, and wash hands and then put on the gloves. R., p. 739. However, PCRC did 
not follow its own hand washing policy, which it characterized as "the most important single 
procedure for prevcnting nosocomial infections." R., p. 750. 
One of PCRC's nurses assigned to Ms. Nield, Joyce Maxfield, did not do this, which the 
Department of Health and Welfare ("DHW") documented in its survey on January 24, 2008. R., p. 
931. In that report, DHW documented that Ms. Maxficld did not follow proper infection prevention, 
such as washing her hands or removing contaminated gloves before and after treating a resident with 
MRSA. R., pp. 671-673( p. 46, II. 20-25; p. 49, I. 14 to p. 50, I. 5; p. 53, I. 13 to p. 55, I. 20); R., 
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pp.923-927. DHW cited PCRC for "failure to provide wound care lIsing proper clean technique 
and universal precautions on two residents, one of whom had a diagnosis of [MRSA] infection." 
R., p. 926-927; p. 931. 
Ms. Nield testified in her deposition that her room was not clean and smelled of urine. She 
also testified that there was mold in the bathroom, and feces in the bed and sink, for weeks. R., p. 
970 ( p. 127,1. 21 to p. 128, I. 13). Ms. Nield also witnessed PCRC's nurses that did not wash their 
hands, and did not have gloves on, before they came into her room. Ms. Nield testified: 
Q. [By. Ms. Duke] And what are those complaints? 
A. Those complaints were, number one, they did not 'wash their hands 
when they came into the room. A lot of them didn't. 
Q. All of the time or some of the time? 
A. Yeah. It was a regular-yeah. It was a regular thing with them. 
They would not wash their hands. I would even tell them, "Hey, 
before you touch me, for my health and your health, wash your 
hands, you know." 
Q. Would they wash them then? 
A. Sometimes they would, sometimes they wouldn't. 
Q. Any other complaints? 
A. Yeah. They wouldn't put gloves 011 to change the ·wound. 
Q. Ever? 
A. Some nurses did; some didn't. And I'd say, "You better put 
gloves on, you know." "Oh, it's okay. It's okay." I said, "No, it's 
not okay, because you're going to either infect me or you're going 
to get infected or something. You need to put gloves on. "Oh, it's 
too hard to wrap all of that stuff with gloves on, you know." 
*** 
And I would, you know, mention it to the nurses. And they'd go, 
"Oh, yeah, it happens all of the time here." 
R., p. 971 (p. 130, 1.25 to p. 132, 1. 3) [Emphasis supplied]. Ms. Nield witnessed that 60(~1 of the 
time, the nurses were not washing their hands or putting on gloves. R" p. 971 (p. 132, II. 4- 9)Ms. 
Nield also witnessed PCRC's nurses or CNAs leaving bandages and not taking the garbage out. R., 
p. 971 (p. 132, II. 10-18). 
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Ms. Nield was also told by CNAs at PCRC that PCRC was "working us to death" and that 
"( t ]here' s not even enough of us to cover." R., p. 978 (p. 161, II. 18 to 21). Ms. Nield also recounted 
being left in a wheelchair for eight straight hours with a broken hip, in pain, and in a wet diaper. R., 
pp. 978-979 (p. 161, I. 22 to p. 162, I. 17). 
Ms. Nield observed that she was housed next to a resident who had MRSA, and witnessed 
him walking in the hallway. R., p. 973 (p. 139, I. 3 to p. 140, I. 12)Ms. Nield was also housed with 
PA infected resident. Ms. Nield's observations were confirmed by DHW. The DHW 1-24-2008 
survey report noted that in August of2007, there was a patient at PCRC who was treated for wound 
care and "pseudomonas cellulitis of both knees." R., p. 921; R., p. 931; R., p. 1059. 
Ms. Nield's observations, and PCRC's staff saying that they did not always wash or glove 
is copacetic with Dr. Coffman's opinion on hand washing. Dr. Coffman testified: 
And when it's [band washing] done-it's interesting, when people do self-
evaluation, self-reporting on hand washing, it's always close to 100 percent. 
But when they're actually observed doing it, yeah, 70, 72 percent, 
60 percent, at some facilities 50 percent. 
R., p. 1012 (p. 64, 11. 17-22) [Emphasis supplied]. 
More telling from Dr. Coffman is that, during his deposition testimony, he admitted that he 
could not rule out where Ms. Nield contracted MRSA. Specifically, Dr. Coffman testified: 
Q. So if PCRC didn't follow infection control procedure, how are you 
able to rule out that Judy Nield did not contract MRSA at PCRC? 
*** 
A. "Veil, I don't think we can tell .... And we don't know where it 
came from. It had a susceptibility pattern that was sort of more 
consistent with the community-acquired strain than a hospital strain. 
So it makes you think it might have come from outside. But we just 
don't know. 
Q. 'Veil, if PCRC is being cited for not following infection control 
procedure, so I mean they didn't follow that, would you be able 
to rule out that Judy didn't contract MRSA from PCRC? 
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A. I can't rule out where she got it from. 
R., p. 1013-1014 (p. 69, I. 18 to p. 73. I. 3) [Empbasis supplied]. Further, Dr. Coffhlan's own 
affidavit amplifies that be cannot determine when Ms. Nield contracted MRSA or PA: "{lit is not 
possible to determine when, where or how Ms. Nield became infected with MRSA or 
pseudomonas." R., pp. 2 J 5 (~i 28) [Emphasis supplied). 
On the other band, Dr. Hugh Selznick, Ms. Nield's treating physician, opined that, to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability, Ms. Nield contracted MRS A and PA from PCRC. Dr. 
Selznick concluded "[Ms. Nield's] colonization with MRSA took place at [PCRC] ... [and] [i]t is 
highly unlikely, in my opinion, that Ms. Nield contracted pseudomonas from any other source other 
than from her [PCRC] hospitalization ... " R., p. 1063. Dr. Selznick further opined that the etiology 
of Ms. Nield's MRSA "was poor infection control measures by the staffat [PCRC). .. and it is my 
opinion Ms. Nield also sustained left lower extremity pseudomonas wound infection while 
hospitalized at [PCRC] as evident per 1119107 culture results." R., p. 1064. Dr. Selznick did the 
follo'vving in reaching his conclusions: 
A. Acknowledged that he was Ms. Nield's treating physician; 
B. Reviewed Ms. Nield's medical records, including, but not limited to, the negative 
test results by the PMC medical providers and the treatment records from PCRC; 
C. Reviewed the DHW reports that PCRC and its medical providers failed to follow 
simple infection prevention procedures, sLlch as hand washing, gloving and de-
gloving after treating MRSA and PA infected residents; 
D. Noted, from the DHW records, tbat other residents with MRSA/PA were housed with 
Ms. Nield. 
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R., pp. 1042-1089. Dr. Selznick concluded that due to PCRC's actions and omissions 111 
transmitting MRSA and PA to Ms. Nield, Ms. Nield had to have her left leg amputated below the 
knee. Dr. Selznick also concluded that, due to PCRC's actions and omissions, Ms. Nield required 
surgery on her right hip. R., pp. 1043-1046; pp. 1059-1066. 
Further, Ms. Nield's other experts, Sidney Gerber, an expert in healthcare administration, 
as well as Suzanne Frederick, a residential care nurse, both opined that PCRC failed to comply with 
state and federal regulations and the standard of care to prevent the transmission of disease and 
infection. Both Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick concluded PCRC's actions and omissions led to Ms. 
Nield's contracting ofMRSA and PA. Both Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick reviewed Judy's medical 
records, including the PMC tests done, as well as the January 24, 2008 survey of PCRC by the 
DHW. DHW found that the staff at PCRC failed to follow proper infection control prevention 
procedures, such as hand washing, which was the result of PCRC failing to properly instruct and 
train its employees on infection control and prevention measures. R., pp. 923-927.; pp. 640-653; 
p.I 096-11 06; pp. 1103-1104. Ms. Frederick concluded that the January 24 ,2008 DHW review 
established that the nurses at PCRC, during wound care, failed to follow the professional practice 
standards and facility policies to prevent infections. Ms. Frederick reasoned nurses repeatedly 
failed to wash their hands at appropriate times during wound care procedures and failed to follow 
proper precautions with a resident that had MRSA. R., pp. 649-650. Ms. Frederick further opined: 
[T]he Director of Nursing and nursing staff of Pocatello Nursing and 
Rehabilitation Center and its owners, managers, and agents failed to adhere 
to applicable standards of care and violated state and federal nursing home 
regulations in addition to facility policies and procedures in their care and 
treatment of Mrs. Nield thereby increasing the risk of harm, causing injury 
and unnecessary pain and suffering to Mrs. Nield, as well as MRSA 
infection. 
R., pp. 649-650. 
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Likewise, Mr. Gerber concluded that PCRC failed to provide an adequate and sufficient, in 
addition to competent, nursing staiTto provide necessary care to prevent Ms. Nield il'om contracting 
MRSA and PA from PCRC. According to Mr. Gerber, the nursing staff at PCRC: 
[W]ere not compliant with the ordinary standard of care and protocols 
established to prevent the spread of infection and in [Mr. Gerber's expert 
opinion], were reckless in not complying with essential and fundamental 
precautions established universally when nursing staff are in physical contact 
with all patients or residents i.e. routine hand washing regardless of 
predisposition or risk Elctors involving MRSA." 
R., p. 1105. Mr. Gerber further characterized PCRC's conduct as follows: 
R.,1106. 
[G]ross violations and significant deviations from the standard of care that 
they were responsible and obligated to provide to Ms. Nield, .. resulting in 
Ms. Nield's injuries and causing her deterioration and needless suffering .. 
. Furthermore, under these circumstances, such conduct in my opinion is 
unj usti flab Ie. 
There is an abundance of evidence in the record, both through expert and lay affidavits and 
deposition testimony, showing that PCRC's actions/omissions were a substantial factor in infecting 
Ms. Nield with MRSA and P A. However, despite this, the District Court granted summary 
judgment and did so by weighing the evidence. It is clear the District Court weighed and assessed 
the credibility of Dr. Coffman and Dr. Selznick in favor of the former, as evidenced in its decision: 
This Court correctly determined that [PCRC's] expert, Dr. CotTman, 
presented admissible, credible testimony establishing that [Ms. Nield] could 
not demonstrate to a reasonable degree of medical certainty when, where, or 
how she contracted MRSA and pseudomonas. 
R., p. 1295 [Emphasis supplied]. 
The District Court further improperly weighed and assessed the credibility of Dr. Selznick 
with Dr. Coffman, when it ignored Dr. Coffman's own admission that" I can't rule OLit where [Ms. 
Nield] got [MRSA] from." R., pp. 1013-1014 (p. 69, I. 18 to p. 73, I. 3). Also, the District Court 
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improperly weighed the evidence in concluding Dr. Selznick did not address "the belief' of the 
ubiquitous nature of MRSA and PA, that Ms. Nield may have been a carrier of those diseases but 
was not infected at the time of her admission, did not explain why the wound culture would not have 
produced a false negative and "why Plaintiff could Ol1~Y have contracted MRSA and pseudomonas 
while admitted at PCRC." R., p. 1235 [Italics in original]. None of those conclusions are supported 
by the record. They were simply based on the argument and supposition offered by PCRC. 
The District Court further misapplied the substantial factor test in concluding "[Dr. Selznick] 
does not address the other factors that could have been a substantial factor in causing the infections." 
R., p. 1235. In its Memorandum Decision denying Ms. Nield's Motion for Reconsideration, the 
District Court misintellxeted the case law by holding that Ms. Nield was required to rule out all 
other causes. R., pp. 1291-93. The District Court's weighing of the evidcnce, i.e. the Affidavit of 
Dr. Selznick, is evident by the District Court's comments at oral argument, as follows: 
THE COURT: Mr. Gabiola, I certainly want to give you the last word. 
guess that's where I came down with this - with Dr. Selznick, and I think 
that's why I made mention in the decision - why I talked about that is 
because of the reasoning and methodology behind his conclusions. I just-
if you look at it, it just wasn't enough for me to be able to say when we get 
to trial, this would be able to assist the jury at all. So that's why I really 
wanted to have addressed at the time of the motion for reconsideration, and 
I can understand, Mr. Larsen's position that I unjustly weighed the evidence 
against Miss Nield, but it seemed to me 1 had two roles in this case. I had to 
look at the evidence for purposes of summary judgment, but I also had to 
look at the evidence provided by Dr. Selznick in particular with regard to 
this, so I don't know if you want to answer or try to address that or if you 
have something else in mind you wanted to tell me, I'll turn the time to you. 
Tr., p. 91, L. 10 to p. 92, L. 8 [Emphasis supplied]. The District Court also did not review Dr. 
Selznick's affidavit and attached reports before improperly concluding that Dr. Selznick's 
methodology was insufficient: 
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MR. GABlOLA: 1 do want to address that, Your Honor, and I think we're 
hung up - 1 think the Court is hung up on this definition of the term 
"methodology." This isn't rocket science, Judge. The methodology Dr. 
Selznick used was reviewing records. He did that, and if you look at the 
report that we attached to his affidavit, he goes through his affidavit. He 
talks about the fact that he looked through twenty-six pounds of medical 
records, and inclusive in those records were the negative test, which Miss 
Duke pointed out, that a lab technician generated this report. Well, doctors 
rely upon reports from lab technicians all the time. They rely upon reports 
from MRIs, but the Pseudomonas that was identified are two different 
variations of Pseudomonas that were identified. 
THE COURT: I didn't see that - Dr. Selznick. 
MR. GABIOLA: He does address that, Your Honor. He talks about his 
conclusions and his methodology in reaching the conclusion as to the 
Pseudomonas in his November 25, 2009, report, which he attached to his 
affidavit, and we incorporated in his affidavit, so 1 don't think it's a fair 
characterization to say all \,\Ie have here are conclusions from Dr. Selznick. 
That's not the case, and that misrepresents the facts in the record. We do 
have his thought methodology, and what he looked at, the medical records, 
what other experts would have done anything differently than Dr. Selznick? 
Nothing of the sort has been pointed out by the defense here. Their own 
expert did the exact same thing Dr. Selznick did. He just arrived at a 
different opinion and that's really what we're arguing about. 
Tr., p. 92, L. 9 to p. 93, L. 22 [Emphasis supplied]. Further, Ms. Nield's counsel invited the District 
COllrt to review Dr. Selznick's affidavit and reports. Tr., p. 98, L. 16 to p. 99, L. 1. However, it 
appears the District Court did not do this. Additionally, the District Court further ignored Dr. 
Coffman's undisputed admission, that he could not rule out where Ms. Nield acquired MRSA or PA, 
yet concluded "Dr. Coffman ... presented admissible, credible testimony establishing that [Ms. 
Nield] could not demonstrate to a reasonable degree of medical certainty when, where, or how she 
contracted MRSA and pseudomonas." R., p. 1295 [Emphasis supplied]. 
The District Court committed further error when it weighed and discounted the reports and 
affidavits of Ms. Nield's other experts, Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick. The District COLlrt 
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concluded, after weighing and assessing the credibil ity ofMr. Gerber's and Ms. Frederick's opinions 
that they both did not establish "where and how [Ms. Nield] contracted MRSA and pseudomonas." 
R., pp. 1293-94. It was obvious the District Court not only improperly weighed those affidavits, but 
discounted the fact that both Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick concluded, from their review of all of 
the medical records, PCRC's own records and the reports from DHW, that Ms. Nield contracted 
MRSA and PA due to PCRC's failure to follow infection control policies and procedures. R., pp. 
648-649; p. 1096; pp. 1103-1106. 
The District Court ignored the fact that Dr. Selznick did establish and conclude, through 
proper methodologies, that Ms. Nield contracted MRSA and PA from PCRC. It was undisputed that 
Dr. Selznick did the following: (I) acknowledged that he was Ms. Nield's treating physician; (2) 
reviewed Ms. Nield's medical records, including, but not limited to, the negative test results by the 
PMC medical providers and the treatment records from PCRC; (3) reviewed the DEW reports that 
PCRC and its medical providers failed to follow simple infection prevention procedures, such as 
hand washing, gloving and de-gloving after treating MRSA and PA infected residents; and (4) noted, 
from the DHW records, that other residents with MRSA/PA were housed with Ms. Nield. R, pp. 
1047-1089. Further, it was not disputed that Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick both reviewed all of the 
medical records, PCRC's own records and the reports from DHW. R., pp. 648-649; p. ]096; pp. 
1103-1106. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court erred in misapplying the summary judgment standard by 
improperly weighing the evidence and failing to give Ms. Nield all reasonable inferences from the 
record; 
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2. Whether the District Coun erred in misapplying the summary judgment standard by 
requiring Ms. Nield to show that she may have been a carrier of MRS A and PA but was not infected 
at the time of her admission; requiring Ms. Nield to show why the wound culture would not have 
produced a false negative; and requiring Ms. Nield to show she could only have contracted MRSA 
and PA while admitted at PCRC's facility; 
3. Whether the District Court erred in misapplying the substantial factor test by 
incorrectly concluding Ms. Nield's experts did not address when, where or how she contracted 
MRSA and PA and rule out other factors that could have been a substantial factor in causing Ms. 
Nield to contract MRSA and PA; 
4. Whether Ms. Nield is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY WEIGHED THE EVIDENCE AND 
FAILED TO GIVE MS. NIELD ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM 
THE RECORD, THEREBY MISAPPLYING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STANDARD. 
The rules applying to a court's determination of summary judgment are as follows: 
As we have reiterated in our recent cases, upon a motion for summary 
judgment, all disputed facts are liberally construed in favor of the 
non-moving party. The burden of proving the absence of a material fact 
rests at all times upon the moving party. This burden is onerous because 
even" Iclircumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material 
fact." Moreover, all reasonable inferences which can be made from the 
record shall be made in favor of the party resisting the motion. If the 
record contains conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds might 
reach different conclusions, a summary judgment must be denied because 
all doubts aloe to be resolved against the moving party. The requirement 
that all reasonable inferences be construed in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party is a strict one. Nevertheless, when a party moves for 
summary judgment the opposing party's case must not rest on mere 
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speculation because a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a 
genuine issue of fact. Notwithstanding the utility of a summary judgment, 
a motion for summary judgment should be granted with caution. 
McCoy v. Lyons ,120 Idaho 765, 769-70, 820 P.2d 360, 364-65(1991 )[Internal citations 
omittedJ[Emphasis added]. Furthermore, it is well-established that on summary judgment, a trial 
court is not allowed to weigh the evidence and resolve all doubts against the movant: 
The trial court, when confronted by a motion for summary judgment, must 
determine if there are factual issues which should be resolved by the trier of 
facts. On such a motion it is not the function of the trial COlll-t to weigh 
the evidence or to determine those issues. Moreover, all doubts must be 
resolved against the party moving for a summary judgment. 
Merrill v. Duffji Reed Constr. Co., 82 Idaho 410,414,353 P.2d 657, 659 (1960)[Emphasis added]. 
See also, American Land Title Co. v. Isaak, 105 Idaho 600,601,671 P.2d 1063, 1064 (J 983) ("A 
trial court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, is not to weigh evidence or resolve 
controverted factual issues."); Idaho State University v. Mitchell, 97 Idaho 724, 730,552 P.2d 776, 
782 (1976)(citing, Merrill, supra); Meyers v. Lott, 133 Idaho 846, 849, 993 P.2d 609, 612 
(2000)("The district court may not weigh the evidence to resolve controverted factual issues."). 
Additionally, "[aJ motion for summary judgment should be denied if the pleadings, admissions, 
depositions, and affidavits raise any question of credibility of witnesses or weight of the evidence." 
Merrill, supra, 82 Idaho at 414,353 P.2d at 659. 
1. The District Court improperly weighed the evidence and credibility of 
witnesses. 
While admitting that Dr. Selznick was qualified to render his opinions (R., p. 1236), the 
District Court weighed his opinions and credibility against those submitted by PCRC's expert, Dr. 
Coffman. The District Court also weighed and assessed the credibility ofMr. Gerber and Ms. 
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Frederick. It is well-settled that a trial court is not allowed to weigh the evidence or assess the 
credibility of witnesses on summary judgment. The District Court violated this rule, again, 
evidenced by its own comments: 
This Court correctly determined that [PCRC's] expert, Dr. Coffman, 
presented admissible, credible testimony establishing tbat [Ms. Nield] could 
not demonstrate to a reasonable degree of medical certainty when, where, or 
how she contracted MRSA and pseudomonas. 
R., p. 1295 [Emphasis supplied]. 
The District Court accepted Dr. Coffman's conclusion that he could not determine where Ms. 
Nield contracted MRSA or PA over Dr. Selznick's conclusion Ms. Nield, to a reasonable degree of 
probability, contracted MRSA and PA due to PCRC's conduct and omissions. This 'vvas not the 
District Court's role; rather, weighing the opinions of Dr. Coffman, Dr. Selznick, Ms. Frederick and 
Mr. Gerber was the role ofthejury. Essentially, the District Court determined Dr. Selznick was less 
credible than Dr. Coffi11an,' finding Dr. Selznick did not address the issue whether Ms. Nield may 
have been a carrier of MRSA or PA, but was not infected at the time of her admission; that the 
testing would not have produced a false negative; and did not address why Ms. Nield could on/)' 
have contracted MRSA and PA while admitted at PCRC. 2 
Not only did the District Court improperly weigh the evidence and assess the witnesses' 
credibility, it also wrongly concluded Dr. Selznick, Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick did not 
address the pertinent issues. Dr. Selznick, Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick did address how Ms. 
, R., p. 1235. 
"The District Court also required Ms. Nield to prove that she only contracted MRSA and 
PA from PCRC, which is incongruent with the "substantial factor" test case law, as will be 
discussed in greater detail in the remainder of this brief. 
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Nield contracted MRS A and P A. All of them reviewed the testing done at PMC, finding that 
Ms. Nield was negative for MRSA and PA prior to her admission. All of them properly relied 
upon the negative test results, as they had a right to do, since that was the accepted standard of 
care for the practice of medicine ill Pocatello, Idaho. All of them reviewed the records from 
PCRC of Ms. Nield's treatment and the DHW records to conclude PCRC did not follow 
infection eontrol procedures. All of them eonsidered that Ms. Nield was housed with residents 
infected with MRSA and PA, that PCRC failed to follow proper and aeeepted infection 
prevention, was cited for its noncompliance by DHW, and that Ms. Nield tested positive for 
MRSA and PA November 9,2007, over three months after she was admitted at PCRC. Dr. 
Selznick, Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederiek utilized and applied the proper methodologies in 
reaehing their conclusions. R., pp. 640-653; pp. 1042-1089; pp. 1096- I 106. 
The District Court also improperly granted summary judgment, given that Dr. Coffman 
admitted he could not rule out vvhere Ms. Nield contracted MRSA and PA. This means Dr. 
Coffman eould not rule out that Ms. Nield contracted MRSA and PA at PCRC. That admission, 
which the District Court ignored in weighing the evidenee, in and of itself, raised a genuine issue 
of material fact precluding summary judgment. Moreover, the District Court improperly refused 
to give Ms. Nield the inferenee from Dr. Coffman's admission he could not rule out that Ms. 
Nield got MRSA and PA from PCRC. 
Further, from the abundant evidence in the record, PCRC's treatment of Ms. Nield was 
below the standard of care. PCRC and its staff did not wash their hands; they did not properly treat 
Ms. Nield's wounds; they did not properly document Ms. Nield's wounds and skin condition; they 
exposed Ms. Nield to MRSA and PA; and, after three months in PCRC, Ms. Nield was positive for 
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both MRSA and PA. R., pp. 671-673; p. p. 739; p. 750; p. 923-927; p. 931. These facts alone 
would also preclude summary judgment, and the District Court committed reversible error in 
gran tin g it. 
2. The District Court did not give any reasonable inference to Ms. Nield, let alone 
every inference. 
The District Court did not give the inference from the screening Ms. Nield had taken of her 
at PMC, prior to her admission to PCRC, that she was negative as a carrier and not infected with 
MRSA and PA. Contrary to the accepted negative test results, the District Court, instead, gave the 
inference that Ms. Nield was a carrier and was potentially infected with MRSA and PA at the time 
of her admission. The District Court apparently based its deeision on Dr. Coffman's unfounded 
speculation. The District Court improperly endorsed that speculation, despite the fact that Dr. 
Coffman, again, admitted "I can't rule out where she got it fMRSAI from." R., pp. 1013- 1014 
[Emphasis added]. Further, Dr. Coffman's own affidavit amplifies that he could not determine 
when, where or how Ms. Nield contracted MRSA or PA: "flit is not possible to determine when, 
where or how Ms. Nield became infected with MRSA or pseudomonas." R., pp. 215 ('128) 
[Emphasis supplied]. 
The District Court improperly gave PCRC the inference, instead of Ms. Nield, based on 
the speCUlation proffered by Dr. CofTman, that the testing done by PMC may have produced a 
false negative. Apparently, the District Court accepted Dr. Coffman's unfounded concl usion that 
not all of the wounds were cultured and that Ms. Nield may have gotten MRSA or PA from 
visitors. Those are inferences to which PCRC, as the movant, was not allowed under the 
summary judgment standard. Additionally, those inferences are not supported by the record. Dr. 
Coffman did not do the testing. He was only speculating about the test results. The record is 
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appropriately silent on the testing done by PMC. It was done. It was proper. It was negative for 
both MRSA and P A. 
Ms. Nield, not PCRC, was entitled to all reasonable inferences, such as: (I) that she was not 
colonized or infected with MRSA or PA, based on the negative test results from the testing done at 
PCRC; (2) that the testing did not prove a false negative; (3) that all of her wounds were cultured; 
(4) that her treating physician, Dr. Selznick, who followed the standard of care, can rely on test 
results negative for MRSA and PA; (5) that it was documented that Ms. Nield was exposed to 
MRSA and PA during her stay at PCRC; (6) that PCRC breached the standard of care in failing to 
adhere to the standard of care for control of infectious diseases, which was documented by DHW; 
and (7) that Dr. Selznick had a right to rely on the positive test results of MRSA and PA in 
November, 2007, to draw the conclusion that PCRC's conduct was a substantial factor in causing 
Ms. Nield's MRSA and PA infections. 
The District Court also failed to consider the fact that PCRC never tested Ms. Nield for 
MRSA and PA prior to or after her admission. Dr. Coffman's defense to that was that Ms. Nield 
was never screened in bel' nares or other parts of her body, yet admitted that that was not the 
standard of care. R., p. 212 ('\13); Tr., p. 29, L.14 to p. 30, L. 3. The District Court also should 
have considered the relevant facts that: (1) PCRC and its medical care providers failed to follow 
infection prevention protocols, which its providers admitted; (2) PCRC was cited for violating 
regulations requiring prevention of the spread of disease, while Ms. Nield was a resident there; 
(3) through Ms. Nield's undisputed deposition testimoni, Ms. Nield was housed next to a 
resident infected with MRSA, and exposed to a resident with PA; and (4) Ms. Nield's testimony 
JpCRC never offered any evidence below contradicting Ms. Nield's testimony that she 
was housed next to, and exposed to residents with MRSA and P A. 
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that she witnessed nurses leaving the MRSA infected resident's room without washing their 
hands and failing to wear gloves before coming to her room. This the District Court clearly did 
not do. 
In addition, PCRC's deficiencies were also described by Ms. Nield's experts, Mr. Gerber and 
Ms. Frederick. Both Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick concluded that, upon reviewing the same records 
Dr. Selznick and PCRC's expert, Dr. Coffman reviewed, PCRC failed to follow infection prevention 
policies that led to Ms. Nield's contracting MRSA and PA. As stated by this Court in Sheridan 1', 
St. LlIke 's Reg '/ Med, Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 785-86, 25 P.3d 88, 98-99 (200 1): 
Furthermore, according to our precedent, proximate cause can be shown 
from a "chain of circumstances from which the ultimate fact required 
to be established is reasonably and naturally inferable." 
* * * 
IA plaintiffl was not required to prove his case beyond a reasonable 
doubt, nor by direct and positive evidence. It was only necessary that he 
show a chain of circumstances from which the ultimate fact required to be 
established is reasonably and naturally inferable. "If the rule of law is as 
contended for by defendant and appellant, and it is necessary to 
demonstrate conclusively and beyond the possibility of a doubt that the 
negligence resulted in the injury, it would never be possible to recover 
in a case of negligence in the practice of a profession which is not an 
exact science." [Internal citations omitted][Emphasis added]. 
(quoting, Formont v. Kircher, 91 Idaho 290, 296, 420 P.2d 661,667 (1966)). The District Court also 
failed to follow the well-settled principle that the burden of proof in a civil case is by "a fair 
preponderance of the evidence." Millerv. Belknap, 75 Idah046, 52, 266 P.2d 662, 665 (1954). The 
proper test is whether, reviewing the record and giving Ms. Nield all reasonable inferences therein, 
Ms. Nield can show, through a chain of circumstances, PCRC's negligence and breach of the 
standard of care were a substantial factor in her contracting MRSA and PA. Ms. Nield has met this. 
In fact, on that, Dr. Coffman agrees, because he could not rule out PCRC's conduct as a cause of Ms. 
Nield's infections. It is patently clear that the District Court improperly granted summary judgment. 
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B. THE DISTRICT COURT MISAPPLIED THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STANDARD IN CONCLUDING MS. NIELD vVAS REQUIRED TO 
ESTABLISH SHE WAS NOT INFECTED AT THE TIME OF HER 
ADMISSION; THAT HER WOUND CULTURES DID NOT PRODUCE A 
FALSE NEGATIVE; AND THAT SHE ONLY COULD HAVE 
CONTRACTED MRSA AND PA AT PCRC. 
The District Court required Ms. Nield to establish proximate cause, by establishing that she 
may have been a carrier of MRSA and PA but was not infected at the time of her admission; 
requiring Ms. Nield to show why the wound culture would not have produced a false negative; and 
requiring Ms. Nield to show she could only have contracted MRSA and PA while admitted at 
PCRC's facility. R., p. 1235. The District Court committed reversible error, as it failed to follow 
the substantial factor test. 
It is well-settled that the "question of proximate cause is one of fact and almost always for 
the jury." Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875, 204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009). The District Court 
misapplied Ms. Nield's burden to establish that jury question. Ms. Nield was not required to 
establish proximate cause by showing that she ol1ly contracted MRSA and P A from PCRC; rather, 
Ms. Nield need only establish proximate cause, through a chain of circLlmstances, that PCRC's 
actions and omissions were a substantial factor in bringing about her injuries. Coombs v. Curnmv, 
148 Idaho 129, 140,219 P.3d 453, 464 (2009) [Emphasis added); Weeks v. EIRJvlC, 143 Idaho 834, 
839, 153 P.3d 1180, 1185 (2007). Proximate cause "can be shown by a 'chain of circumstances 
from which the ultimate fact required to be established is reasonably and naturally 
inferable.'" Weeks, supra, 143 Idaho at 839,153 P.3d 1185, citing, Sheridan, sllpra, 135 Idaho 
at 785, 25 P.3d at 98 [Emphasis added). 
Additionally, the District Court ignored the substantial factor test when it, improperly, 
concl uded that Ms. Nield!lli!.Y have been a carrier and not infected when she was admitted to PCRC 
and the testing done by PMC may have produced a false negative. Apparently, the District Court 
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accepted Dr. Coffman's speculation Ms. Nield may have been a carrier, based on the lack of 
screening. What is patently erroneous is that the District Court accepted this fi·om Dr. Coffman, 
despite the fact that he admitted it was not the standard of care to do any screening. R., p. 212; Tr., 
p. 29, L. 14 to p. 30, L. 3. The District Court further accepted Dr. Coffman's unfounded conclusion 
that not all of the wounds were cultured and that Ms. Nield mav have gotten MRSA or PA hom 
visitors. Again, those are inferences to which PCRC, as the movant, "vas not allowed under the 
summary judgment standard. Additionally, the record does not support those inferences, since Dr. 
Coffman did not do the testing, and speculated about the test results. The record is appropriately 
silent on the testing done by PMC. There is no dispute PMC tested Ms. Nield for MRSA and PA, 
that it was proper and that she was negative for both MRSA and PA. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN MISAPPLYING THE 
SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST BY CONCLUDING MS. NIELD'S EXPERTS 
DID NOT ADDRESS WHEN, WHERE OR HOW SHE GOT MRSA AND PA 
AND BY REQUIRING MS NIELD'S EXPERTS TO RULE OUT OTHER 
FACTORS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR IN 
CAUSING HER TO CONTRACT MRSA AND PA. 
The District Court erroneously decided, after weighing Dr. Selznick's, Mr. Gerber's and Ms. 
Frederick's affidavits, that Ms. Nield did not establish a genuine issue of material fact. The District 
Court not only improperly weighed those affidavits and assessed their cred ibil ity, it also misapplied 
the substantial factor test. The record shows that Ms. Nield established a chain of circumstances and 
met the substantial factor test. 
1. Standard for expert testimony. 
Idaho Rules of Evidence 702 and 703 govern the admissibil ity of expert testimony. Rule 702 
provides as follows: 
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Ifscientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge \vill assist the trier of 
i~lct to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a \vitness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Rule 703 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion 
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or 
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts 
or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or 
inference to be admitted. 
Expert testimony in medical malpractice cases is admissible when: 
'[T]he expert is a qualified expert in the field, the evidence will be of assistance to 
the trier offact, experts in the particular field would reasonably rely upon the same 
type of facts relied upon by the expert in forming his opinion, and the probative 
value of the opinion testimony is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect. ' 
Coombs, supra, 148 Idaho at 140,219 P.3d at 464 (quoting, Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 47,844 
P.2d 24,29 (CL App. 1992)). Admissibility of an expert's opinion "depends on the validity of the 
expert's reasoning and methodology, rather than his or her ultimate conclusion." ld. Moreover, 
where an expert's reasoning or methodology is scientifically sound and "based upon a 'reasonable 
degree of medical probability'" and not a mere possibility, such testimony will assist the trieroffact. 
See, Bloc/zingv. Albertson's, Inc., 1291daho 844,846-47,934 P.2d 17,19-20 (l997) (quotil1g, 
Roberts v. Kit Mfg. Co., 124 Idaho 946, 948, 866 P.2d 969, 971 (1993 )).4 
41n Blochillg, this Court disallowed a physician's testimony that was "possible" and not 
based upon a "reasonable degree of medical probability." ld., 129 Idaho at 846, 934 P.2d at 19. 
Dr. Selznick based his opinions on a reasonable degree of medical certainty (R., p. 1043; p. 
1063-64). Further, Ms. Frederick based her opinions to a reasonable degree of nursing certainty 
(R., p. 649). Finally, Mr. Gerber based his opinions on a reasonable degree of certainty (R., p. 
1106). 
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In Weeks, supra, a medical malpractice case, this Court held that a district court erred in 
granting summary judgment, when the district court excluded expert testimony. This Court reasoned 
that where the expert based his opinions on his experience and research, and made inferences from 
facts known to him, it was reversible error to grant summary judgment. Weeks, supra, 143 Idaho 
at 839-40, 153 P.3d at 1185-86. Also in Weeks, this Court followed the well-settled principle that 
to survive summary judgment, the plaintiff c10es not need to rule out all factors, but only needs to 
establish proximate cause by showing, through a chain of circumstances, the defendant's actions 
and omissions were a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries. ld., 143 Idaho 834, 839,153 
P.3d 1180, 1 185 (2007). the District Court, like the one in Weeks, committed reversible error in 
weighing and assessing the credibility of Dr. Selznick's, Mr. Gerber's and Ms. Frederick's opinions 
and ignoring other admissible facts. 
2. Ms. Nield submitted admissible expert opinions and other evidence, thereby 
satisfying the substantial factor test. 
The District Court acknowledged that Dr. Selznick was qualified to provide expert 
testimony. Despite making that finding, the District Court stated Dr. Selznick could not offer 
opinions that will assist the jury. R., p. 1236. To the contrary, the record shows Dr. Selznick's 
opinions are admissible under Coombs and Weeks, such that Ms. Nield met the substantial factor 
test. First, Dr. Selznick relied upon facts that other experts rely upon; that is, he reviewed Ms. 
Nield's medical records, including her negative test results in August of 2007, and the positive 
results taken after her admission in November, 2007; he reviewed the OHW records establishing 
PCRC's failure to follow infection prevention protocols; he reviewed PCRC's records of its 
treatment, or lack thereof, of Ms. Nield; and he reviewed the OHW records to find that PCRC was 
hous1!lg MRS A and PA infected residents. R., pp. 1047-1089. Based on his experience and 
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research, like the expert witness in JYeeks, Dr. Selznick properly concluded Ms. Nield contracted 
MRSA and PA due to PCRC's actions and omissions. Again, Ms. Nield does not have to establish 
she only could have contracted MRSA or PA from PCRC, onlv that PCRC's conduct was a 
substantial factor in causing her injuries. Dr. Selznick's opinions establish Ms. Nield's met that 
test, and, at the very least, raised genuine issues of material fact. 
Additionally, the District Court misconstrued its role in deciding the motion for summary 
judgment. The District Court mistakenly determined it was acting as a "gate keeper" a role 
associated with Daubert. It is well-established that Idaho has not adoptedDaubert. Weeks. supra, 
143 Idaho at 838, 153 P.3d at 1184.5 See also, Swallow v. Emergency Med. of Idaho , 138 Idaho 589, 
595 n.l, 67 P.3d 68, 74 (2003); Stale 1'. Jl1erwin, 13 I Idaho 642, 646, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (1998». 
LR.E. 702 and 703 are the standards by which a court is to determine the admissibility of an expert's 
opinions. The District Court misapplied I.R.E. 702 and 703 by trading the "methodology" or 
"reasoning" element a physician would use, i.e review medical records, performing research and 
basing an opinion on experience with the unfounded speculations of Dr. Coffil1an, that Ms. Nield 
may have been a carrier but was not infected, and that her wound culture may have been a false 
negative. I.R.E. 702 and 703 only required Dr. Selznick, Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick to apply 
5As this Court in Weeks, supra, 143 Idaho at 838,153 P.3d at 1184, stated, 
The Court has not adopted the Daubert standard for admissibility of an 
expert's testimony but has used some of Daubert's standards in assessing 
whether the basis of an expert's opinion is scientifically valid. See Swallow 
v. Emergency !VIed. ol/da!7o, 138 Idaho 589, 595 n.l, 67 P.3d 68, 74 (2003) 
("this Court has not adopted the Daubert test for admissibility"). The 
Daubert standards of whether the theory can be tested and whether it has 
been subjected to peer-review and publication have been applied, but the 
Court has not adopted the standard that a theory must be commonly agreed 
upon or generally accepted." 
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their experience and review of records to satisfy the methodology element of the rule, which they 
all did. 
Also, the District Court misconstrued the substantial factor test in requiring Ms. Nield to 
show she could only have contracted MRSA and PA from PCRC. Presumably, the District Court 
got this 6'om this Court's decision in Weeks, where the Court stated the following dicta in relation 
to a differential diagnosis case: 
The Ninth Circuit allowed for the use of differential diagnosis under Dauber! 
to establish reliability of an expert's opinion. Clausell, 339 F.3d at 1057-58. 
Differential diagnosis involves an analysis of all hypotheses that might 
explain the patient's symptoms or mortality. ld. After identifying all of the 
potential causes of symptoms, the expert then engages in a process of 
eliminating hypotheses in order to reach a conclusion as to the most likely 
cause. Jd. When using differential diagnosis a district court is justified in 
excluding the expert's testimony if the expert fails to offer an explanation 
why an alternative cause is ruled out. Jd. 
Weeks, supra, 143 Idaho at 849,153 P.3d 1185. This is not a differential diagnosis case, and Ms. 
Nield was not required to eliminate any other causes and show that she could only have gotten 
MRSA and PA from PCRC. Instead, as this Court stated, Ms. Nield only needed to show proximate 
cause, "Iblya 'chain of circumstances from which the ultimate fact required to be established 
is reasonably and naturally inferable." Ffleeks, supra, 143 Idaho at 849, 153 P.3d 1185. (quoting, 
Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Clr., 135 Idaho 775, 785, 25 P.3d 88, 98 (2001». 
The District Court improperly weighed the evidence when it discounted the opinions ofMr. 
Gerber and Ms. Fredericks, as well as Ms. Nield's own observations establishing the "chain of 
circumstances" sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick concluded, 
from their review of all of the medical records, state and federal regulations, PCRC's own records 
and the reports fi'om DHW, that Ms. Nield contracted MRS A and PA due to PCRC's failure to 
follow infection contro!' R., pp. 640-653; pp. 1096-1106. Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick also 
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concluded PCRC failed to adequately train its medical care providers, and failed to provide an 
adequate number of staff, which resulted in Ms. Nield contracting MRSA and PA from PCRC. 
It must be remembered that Ms. Nield's doctors required PCRC to perform daily wound 
assessments. PCRC did not comply. PCRC did them weeki v and also incompetentlv as they 
failed to properlv document the size of the wound, what the wound looked like, and any other 
identification of the wound in the skin assessments/ ulcer sore sheets. peRC completely stopped 
documentation of two of the wounds on September 18,2007, and the largest wound on October 
22,2007, a few weeks prior to Ms. Nield testing: positive for MRSA and PA. R., pp. 603-639; 
pp. 648-653; p. 678; pp.1 027-1 029; pp. 1095-1097; pp. 1098-1 106. Furthermore, PCRC was 
found to be in violation of state and federal standards by DHW on January 24, 2008. DHW 
found that the staff at PCRC could not demonstrate proper infection control policies and 
procedures when handling patients that had MRSA. R., pp. 671-673; p. 750; pp. 923-927; p. 
931. All of Ms. Nield's experts - Dr. Selznick, Ms. Frederick and Mr. Gerber considered these 
facts in reaching their respective opinions. 
Additionally, there was undisputed evidence Ms. Nield was hOllsed in a room next to a 
resident that had MRSA and that another resident was infected with PA. R., p. 921; p. 931: p. 973. 
Ms. Nield also testified that she witnessed nurses exiting the MRSA patient's rool11 without any 
gloves on or washing their hands. R., pp. 971-72. These facts are sufficient to precl ude summary 
judgment, as they establish the chain of circumstances that may lead a jury to conclude Ms. Nield 
was infected with MRSA and PA due to PCRC's conduct and omissions. The records establishes 
Ms. Nield's case was and is appropriate for a jury to resolve, not the District Court. 
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D. MS. NIELD IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON 
APPEAL. 
Ms. Nield is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code §12-121 and Idaho 
Appellate Rules 40 and 41. Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 allow for the award of attorney's 
fees and costs in a civil action where a matter was defended frivolously, unreasonably and without 
foundation. LA.R. 40 allows for the award of costs to the prevailing party on appeal. Ms. Nield 
submits that PCRC was clearly not entitled to summary judgment, and that the District Court's grant 
of summary judgment was unreasonable and without foundation. This case is, unequivocally, the 
epitome of a case that should have been presented to the jury for resol ution, not the District Court. 
For these reasons, Ms. Nield is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Nield respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment, and remand the case to the District Court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this ~ day of December, 2011. 
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